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ABstrACt. In challenging times for European energy security, the European Union (EU) is seeking to extend its energy 
policy powers. At the same time, with its message that the High North represents diversification away from less stable energy 
regions, Norway is trying to get attention in Brussels. this article inquires into the place of Norway and its Arctic oil and 
gas in the processes of developing an Energy Policy for Europe and the Northern dimension Initiative. Central questions to 
be addressed are whether Norwegian Arctic areas are emerging as a new energy region to rely on for diversified oil and gas 
imports for the European Union, and whether Norway, as a small state but a major energy exporter with a considerable part of 
the Barents sea shelf, is able to take advantage of this position in its diplomatic relations with Brussels. the study shows that 
Norway has managed to use its Arctic oil and gas to create awareness of the Norwegian High North in Brussels between 2006 
and 2008, but these efforts have not resulted in more active political interest on the part of the EU. A combination of institu-
tional confusion in the EU, lack of coherence and clarity in the Norwegian High North initiative, and Norway’s established 
reputation as an energy supplier place important constraints on the prospects for more concrete political attention from the EU, 
and thus on Norway’s ability to take advantage of its High North oil and gas in a foreign policy context. 
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RÉSUMÉ. En période difficile sur le plan de la sécurité énergétique en Europe, l’Union européenne (UE) cherche à étendre 
ses pouvoirs en matière de politique de l’énergie. Par la même occasion, grâce au message qu’elle envoie et selon lequel le 
Grand Nord représente une diversification loin des régions énergétiques moins stables, la Norvège essaie d’attirer l’attention 
à Bruxelles. Cet article se penche sur le rôle de la Norvège de même que sur celui du gaz et du pétrole de l’Arctique dans 
les  processus d’élaboration d’une politique de l’énergie pour l’Europe et dans le cadre de l’initiative de la dimension septen-
trionale. Parmi les questions centrales à aborder, notons celle à savoir si les régions arctiques de la Norvège sont en train 
d’émerger comme nouvelle région énergétique dont on pourra dépendre pour les importations diversifiées de pétrole et de 
gaz de l’Union européenne, de même que la question à savoir si la Norvège, en tant que petit État mais que grand exportateur 
d’énergie ayant un accès considérable à la plateforme de la mer de Barents, est en mesure de profiter de cette situation dans le 
cadre de ses relations diplomatiques avec Bruxelles. Cette étude montre que la Norvège a réussi à utiliser son pétrole et son gaz 
de l’Arctique pour bien faire connaître le Grand Nord norvégien à Bruxelles entre 2006 et 2008, mais que ces efforts n’ont pas 
donné lieu à un plus grand intérêt politique actif de la part de l’EU. Un ensemble de confusion institutionnelle au sein de l’EU, 
de manque de cohérence et de clarté sur le plan de l’initiative du Grand Nord norvégien de même que de la réputation établie de 
la Norvège en tant que fournisseur d’énergie imposent d’importantes contraintes aux possibilités d’avoir une attention politique 
plus concrète de la part de l’EU et, par conséquent, à l’aptitude de la Norvège à miser sur son pétrole et son gaz du Grand Nord 
dans un contexte de politique étrangère. 
Mots clés : Arctique, Grand Nord, Norvège, Union européenne, pétrole, gaz, Dimension septentrionale, politique de l’énergie 
pour l’Europe
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INtrOdUCtION
Over the past few years, international attention to the Arctic 
has increased dramatically. Key actors such as the United 
states, russia, Canada, Norway, and the European Union 
(EU) have already developed new Arctic strategies, and 
interest in the Arctic Council is also growing, for example, 
within non-Arctic states such as China and south Korea 
(Hansen, 2008a, b; Young, 2008). these developments are 
motivated by a complex set of factors, including climate 
change and thaw of the polar ice, a projected increase in 
economic activity (shipping and energy development), and 
unresolved border issues. A great deal of the motivation lies 
in the potentially huge oil and gas resources in this region, 
which includes the European Arctic with its Barents sea, 
the geographical focus of this article. 
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In Norway, the recent wave of political and public inter-
est in the Arctic dates back to around 2002–03. this inter-
est materialized in public documents on the topic in 2003, 
and in 2006 found its most concrete expression so far in the 
Norwegian government’s High North strategy (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). During the first years, 
it was not the circumpolar Arctic that triggered attention in 
Norway, but the Arctic areas adjacent to Norway, called the 
High North. (for a thorough analysis of Norwegian High 
North policy and discourse since early 2000, see Hønne-
land and Jensen, 2008.) the High North strategy assumed 
that an interest in the Arctic already existed among actors 
such as the EU, and it aimed to take advantage of this inter-
est. However, it soon became clear that interest and knowl-
edge about the Arctic in Brussels were not as great as Oslo 
had assumed. Consequently, by using what was believed to 
be a significant energy potential in the Barents Sea, Norway 
wanted to draw political attention to the country and the 
High North region from a Europe that increasingly needed 
to diversify its energy supplies. Establishment of so-called 
High North dialogues with the European Union was identi-
fied as the manner in which to draw attention, and the Bar-
ents sea was to be presented as a new oil and gas province 
that could contribute significantly to EU energy security. 
In an ever-tightening world oil and gas market, Arctic 
resources might become a foreign policy asset for states 
with territory in the region, as importing states and com-
panies alike start looking for new energy regions to be 
explored. this article focuses on Norway’s ability to take 
advantage of its Arctic resource in its relations with the 
European Union. It addresses the following questions: Is 
the Barents sea emerging as a new energy region to rely on 
for diversified oil and gas imports for the European Union? 
Can Norway—as a small state but major energy exporter, 
with a considerable part of the Barents sea shelf—take 
advantage of this situation in its diplomatic relations with 
Brussels? More specifically, how has EU policy responded 
to the energy component in Norway’s High North diplo-
macy, and to what degree? The time scope stretches from 
1997, when finland initiated the Northern dimension Ini-
tiative, up until January 2008, when José Manuel Barroso 
became the second European Commission (EC) President 
ever to visit Norway. thus, the article presents a study of 
EU energy policy in the European Arctic in the very early 
stages of the generally increased political interest in the cir-
cumpolar Arctic. 
One important factor examined is how EU policy- 
makers define the situation in which they develop their 
approach to Norwegian High North policy. the literature 
on foreign policy analysis holds that the manner in which 
policy-makers define situations becomes another way of 
expressing how the state is oriented to action, and why 
(Snyder et al., 2002). The actor defines the situation in terms 
of the way he “relates himself to other actors, to possible 
goals, and to possible means, and in terms of the way means 
and ends are formed into strategies of action subject to rel-
evant factors in the situation” (snyder et al., 2002:64). An 
evaluation of how EU policy-makers define Norway as an 
energy producer and supplier, along with other energy pol-
icy considerations, will provide a tool with which to assess 
whether Norwegian High North energy policy is viewed as 
relevant for EU energy policy. 
NOrWAY’s HIGH NOrtH POlICY
ANd EU ENErGY sECUrItY
In 2005, the Norwegian Government (2005, 2007) 
declared the High North its number one priority for both 
national and foreign policy. the High North initiative encom-
passes a variety of issue areas from domestic to foreign pol-
icy. the Barents sea as an oil and gas region is high on the 
list of issues discussed, along with fisheries, jurisdictional 
issues, climate change, and environmental policies. One of 
the main ideas behind the High North initiative was iterated 
in a white paper from the Norwegian Ministry of foreign 
Affairs (2005), which acknowledged the need to develop an 
overall approach to the High North that coordinated and bal-
anced different interests and policies in the region. 
The realization that the High North was not as strategi-
cally important to key allies as it had been during the Cold 
War was an important motivation for directing attention 
to the region. the foreign Ministry assumed that Norway 
was now more on its own in the region, although the United 
states still had a certain focus on the area as part of its 
global strategy. the previous Norwegian government had 
already stated in 2001 that “a sharper focus on non-military 
factors that impact allies’ security [was] central” to keep-
ing attention on the High North (Norwegian Ministry of 
foreign Affairs, 2001:47). the fear, from both energy and 
security points of view, of being marginalized and left alone 
with russia in the region was thus a major reason behind 
the High North initiative. 
It is difficult to pinpoint the specifics of the High North 
policy, but it is clear that the external dimension of the pol-
icy is divided in two main pillars: bilateral relations with 
russia and High North dialogues with key allies, such as 
the United states and the EU. the content of these dialogues 
has been quite vague and dynamic, but the Barents sea as a 
future energy province clearly has an important place. to 
the EU, Norway has stressed two aspects of energy in the 
High North. First, the resource potential is significant: the 
Barents sea might become Europe’s new energy province. 
second, Norway is a stable energy supplier in an unstable 
world, offering secure and predictable framework condi-
tions for international companies operating on the Norwe-
gian Continental shelf. the EU, seeking to increase energy 
security and promote the interests of European compa-
nies abroad, should direct attention to these favorable con-
ditions. Thus, the High North is presented as a sizeable 
energy region in which Norway can play an important role 
for future development. In a speech in 2006, Norwegian 
foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr støre (2006) said:
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the emergence of the Barents sea as a new European 
energy province adds a renewed interest to the whole 
region. fifteen years ago we sought to bring European 
officials to the north to introduce them to the Arctic 
realities. today, they come all by themselves, driven not 
by altruism but by legitimate self-interest. 
The more specific content of Norway’s High North policy 
that EU policy-makers must relate to concerns Norwegian 
regulations regarding the pace of resource development and 
environmental standards in the region. These are specified 
in the 2006 Management Plan (Norwegian Ministry of the 
Environment, 2006:122–126) and the High North strategy 
(Norwegian Ministry of foreign Affairs, 2006). the Man-
agement Plan specifies areas that are not to be opened for 
exploration activity (northern parts of the Barents sea and 
the sea areas west and north of the lofoten Islands, as well 
as particularly vulnerable sections of the southern Barents 
Sea), and the High North Strategy summarizes Norway’s 
priorities in the High North, which include aspirations to 
“provide a suitable framework for further development of 
petroleum activities in the Barents sea” (Norwegian Minis-
try of foreign Affairs, 2006:8). 
In 2000, the European Commission projected that the 
EU’s energy-import dependence (the share of imported 
energy in its total energy mix) would reach about 70% 
for gas and 90% for oil by 2030 (EC, 2000:20). In 2007, 
those numbers had risen to 84% dependence on imported 
gas and 93% dependence on imported oil (EC, 2007a:3). 
At the same time, oil and gas prices remained high dur-
ing the period studied here, and opportunity-constrained 
international oil companies were looking for new areas to 
explore and develop as an ever-greater share of the world’s 
resource base was in the hands of national oil companies. In 
the European Community, scepticism about the market as 
a guarantor of stable and diversified supplies was growing. 
Consequently, energy security emerged as a top priority, 
and the energy field was politicized by integrating energy 
policy to a greater extent into foreign policy.
With the aim of increasing EU energy security, here 
understood as diversification of oil and gas imports, the 
Commission has initiated and sought to strengthen energy 
dialogues with important oil and gas producers such as rus-
sia, Algeria, and Norway. Efforts have also been undertaken 
to develop a common Energy Policy Europe (EPE). More-
over, the European Union has a formal policy for northern 
Europe through its Northern dimension Initiative (NdI), 
and energy security formed part of the motivation under- 
lying that initiative (see, for example, lipponen, 1997). 
these developments should represent a golden opportunity 
for Norway with its High North initiative. 
MEtHOds ANd dEfINItIONs
The EU approach is defined as EU actions toward Nor-
way that are related to energy in the High North. these 
actions may be in the form of oral or written official pol-
icy, or they might be more specific acts undertaken by EU 
officials, such as participation at official or unofficial meet-
ings with Norwegian policy-makers on High North energy 
issues. Or the approach may simply be non-action. 
since Norway’s present High North policy is relatively 
new, it is not likely that we will be able to see its impact in 
formal policy documents within the EU at this point. the 
EU approach is therefore studied in both formal and infor-
mal policy. Formal policy is defined as policy documents, 
as well as public speeches and statements by EU officials. 
Policy documents from the European Commission, the 
Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, 
and the European Council pertaining to an Energy Policy 
for Europe and the Northern dimension Initiative were 
examined, as well as official statements from EU-Norwe-
gian energy interactions. documents and speeches were 
found in the Eurlex and rapid databases and on the Nor-
wegian government’s search site. Informal policy includes 
views that EU officials have expressed in meetings about 
the High North (with Norwegian officials or others) as long 
as the meetings have not produced official statements. Infor-
mal policy also means EU officials’ descriptions of the EU 
approach to the topic at issue. Informal policy was identified 
by examining the data gathered from 31 semi-structured 
interviews with representatives of the EU Commission, the 
Parliament, and the Council during the summer of 2006 and 
the spring and summer of 2008. Interviewees included Nor-
wegian government representatives in Brussels and Oslo, as 
well as EU officials in Oslo. Finally, I interviewed energy 
industry representatives and experts on EU energy policy.
EU INstItUtIONs ANd ENErGY POlICY
the European Commission is the most relevant point 
of contact for Norway in the process of trying to affect 
EU energy policy-making process. the Commission does 
not have legislative powers, but works as an agenda setter 
and policy proposer, and it is also the executive institution 
within the EU system. 
Another main institutional structure in the EU is its Par-
liament, the largest multinational parliament in the world, 
with 785 national representatives directly elected in the 
member states every fifth year. Introduction of the co- 
decision procedure has significantly extended the Parlia-
ment’s decision-making powers vis-à-vis the Council of the 
European Union. the co-decision procedure is now by far 
the most common decision-making procedure in the Union 
(for more details on the procedure, see Bache and George, 
2006). 
traditionally, the Council of the European Union has 
been the primary decision-making institution in the EU. 
(this Council is not to be confused with the European 
Council, which is an assembly of EU heads of state or gov-
ernment and the president of the Commission.) since min-
isters of the member states meet within the Council of the 
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EU, it is also often referred to as “the Council of Ministers,” 
or often just “the Council.” depending on what issues are to 
be discussed, member states send their ministers of foreign 
affairs, energy, transport, and so on to the Council sessions. 
like the Parliament, and unlike the Commission, the Coun-
cil has legislative powers. 
One can expect institutional factors within the EU to 
shape the EU response to Norwegian High North energy 
policy. the Commission is in a unique position to manipu-
late both domestic and international pressures on national 
governments to advance the process of European integra-
tion, even when governments might be reluctant (Bache 
and George, 2006:9). the Commission is the policy initiator 
and, except in rare cases, “enjoys a monopoly of legislative 
initiative” (scapucci, 1998:36). When Commission propos-
als are adopted by the Council, they usually contain a large 
portion of the original proposal text (Hull, 1993:83). this 
agenda-setting role makes the Commission a crucial body 
for influencing the details of policy proposals (Bache and 
George, 2006:340), as the drafter is also usually in need of 
ideas and information (Hull, 1993:83). It is therefore rel-
evant for Norway how policy-makers within the Commis-
sion relate to Norway and the Barents sea as an oil and gas 
region at this early stage of the policy-making process. 
What is clear, however, is that the foreign dimension of 
energy still belongs within the competence of each mem-
ber state, and the EU has been unable to include energy in 
its treaties thus far. Consequently, the Commission lacks 
competence for its external energy policy. despite certain 
internal differences between various directorates General 
(see Usherwood, 1998:122), the Commission has worked to 
extend its competence within the energy field. It has con-
sistently sought to take advantage of external windows of 
opportunity to launch common energy policy proposals, 
including proposals for a common policy on security of sup-
ply (Matláry, 1997:58–61). developments in the Common-
wealth of Independent states (CIs) and Eastern European 
countries after the collapse of the soviet Union represented 
such a window. the EU-russian energy dialogue is an 
example of a concrete energy-policy process in which the 
Commission to a considerable extent has been acting on 
behalf of the member states. similarly, it might be expected 
that the Norwegian High North initiative, with its empha-
sis on the Barents sea as an energy region, would provide 
a window of opportunity to a Commission in search of 
extended energy-policy powers. Moreover, because of lack 
of personnel, the Commission needs expert knowledge to 
help develop policy proposals, as well as to support those 
proposals (Mazey and Richardson, 1993:21). Norway might 
be viewed as a sort of interest group that, with its expert 
knowledge on energy developments in the High North, 
could assist the Commission in developing an energy pol-
icy for the Community, as well as a Northern dimension 
policy. 
the European Parliament plays a relatively small but 
increasingly important role in the energy sector, and it has 
a particular interest in the environmental and consumer 
aspects (Usherwood, 1998:122). the role of the Council of 
the European Union, or the Council of Ministers, is essen-
tially that of adoption or sanction. since a “need for com-
mon interests to be defined is imposed on member states 
in their capacity as members of the European Council, (…) 
the forum for voicing purely national interests remains the 
Council of Ministers, but by that stage much of the policy-
making has already been done” (Matláry, 1997:131). Never-
theless, the Council is the primary decision taker in the EU 
policy cycle. 
Since the final document adopted by the Council usu-
ally retains much of the text of the Commission’s original 
policy proposal, it is important that Norway enter the pol-
icy process as early as possible. According to Greenwood 
(1997:8), “If you have not been able to influence the Com-
mission draft proposal, you have probably lost the case.” 
Hull (1993) and Greenwood (1997) note some guiding 
principles for stakeholders who seek to influence EU pol-
icy-making processes. The first is to present their strategy 
clearly and concisely. A clear objective is important even in 
cases when the aim is only to establish a dialogue and pro-
vide a sympathetic ear. Next, since the Commission relies 
on outside expertise, it is important to do thorough research 
and base the input on sound and accurate information. It is 
advantageous to already be established as a useful source of 
information. finally, stakeholders who want to affect policy 
should appreciate the limits of what they can achieve (Hull, 
1993). In summary, according to Mazey and Richardson 
(1993:24), the groups most likely to succeed are those “with 
an ability to put forward rational and technical arguments 
which will assist in the formulation of practical policies at 
the European level.”
finally, in policy network theory, resource dependen-
cies—the extent to which actors depend on each other for 
resources—are the key variables in shaping policy out-
comes (rhodes, 1988). In line with this, it is argued that 
the degree to which EU officials perceive that Norway has 
something to offer the EU in the process of developing its 
Energy Policy for Europe or the Northern dimension Initia-
tive is crucial to the amount of attention paid to Norway. 
Norway’s impact will be discussed with these conditions 
in mind: influence on the Commission draft proposal, clear 
strategy, and sound and accurate information. the more of 
these conditions that are fulfilled, the greater the chances 
are that Norway will be viewed as a window of opportunity 
by a Community seeking extended energy-policy powers 
and can take advantage of its Arctic oil and gas resources 
in its relations with the EU. from the above, it seems logical 
to expect that, to the degree that the EU shows an interest 
in Norwegian energy policy in the High North, this interest 
will be greatest within the Commission. Yet, the more the 
topic is included in documents of the Council and the Par-
liament, the more impact Norway will have exerted on the 
EU policy processes studied. 
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ENErGY IN tHE HIGH NOrtH 
– fOrMAl EU POlICY
The Northern Dimension Initiative 
In 1997, finnish Prime Minister Paavo lipponen pre-
sented the Northern dimension Initiative publicly for the 
first time (Lipponen, 1997:30). The interim report that fol-
lowed noted that “the strategic importance of the North’s 
natural resources is foremost to both the region and the 
Community” (EC, 1998:5–6). the emphasis on the energy 
resources in the Barents region within the NdI is also noted 
by Arter (2000:683). the long-term potential for exploita-
tion of the oil and gas resources in the NdI region is men-
tioned in all ensuing NdI documents, with one exception: 
the 2001 inventory of current activities (EC, 2001). How-
ever, the subject is not treated in much detail. some prior-
ity projects, like the Shtokman field, are noted, but nothing 
more seems to have come out of it. 
Up until 2004 the Arctic was seen mostly in connection 
with nuclear safety in northwestern russia and the gener-
ally vulnerable Arctic environment. However, the three 
most recent progress reports (EC, 2005, 2006c, 2007f) treat 
the Barents sea as an oil and gas region with separate bul-
let points under the heading of energy, where the focus is 
on Norwegian energy policy in the High North. there is no 
mention of russia:
following the Norwegian Government’s decision to 
allow petroleum activities to be resumed in the Barents 
sea in 2003, exploratory drilling is underway. there is 
expected to be keen interest from European companies 
in the 19th licensing round .… the vulnerable 
environment and potentially significant petroleum 
reserves in this area also present a significant techno-
logical challenge (EC, 2005: par. 3.2.2.4).
the 2006 progress report (EC, 2007f: par. 3.2.2.4.) also 
takes note of the Norwegian High North strategy, as well 
as the Integrated Management Plan; however, it is not more 
specific about concrete EU policy priorities.
the Council and the Parliament have been less involved 
in the NdI than the Commission. Nevertheless, the Council 
has been the driving force behind emphasizing the Arctic 
as a separate area within the Northern dimension frame-
work. It has noted the strategic potential of the northern 
regions, but also stressed that the Northern dimension 
should concentrate on environmental policy (Council of the 
European Union, 1999: par. 2). like the Council, the Parlia-
ment seems to have a basically circumpolar understanding 
of the Northern dimension area. Moreover, the Parliament 
has expressed concern over “the tendency to over-empha-
size the exploitation of fossil fuels and neglect the signifi-
cant role which renewable sources of energy could play in 
the region” (European Parliament, 2003: par. 6). 
A 2006 framework document states that russia, Norway, 
and Iceland are to be included as equal partners with the 
EU within the New Northern dimension (Northern dimen-
sion, 2006a). there is no mention of the Barents sea as an 
energy region, nor was this topic discussed during drafting 
of the document, according to one Norwegian official who 
participated in the process. there are plans for developing 
a partnership for transport and logistics (Northern dimen-
sion, 2006b: par. 6), but it is not clear whether or how Arc-
tic oil and gas will link into this partnership. the fact that 
the Northern dimension is no longer purely an EU proc-
ess might make it less relevant in the future as an arena in 
which Norway can affect EU policy. 
Arctic oil and gas are not treated as particularly impor-
tant in the Northern dimension, but are simply included 
among the factors held to give the region importance and 
relevance for the EU (see, for example, Michel, 2005 and 
Patten, 2001). There have been only a few official speeches 
on the Northern dimension from EU representatives. rep-
resentatives of the Commission’s directorate General for 
External relations have been the most active ones. I found 
only one speech that discussed more specifically the role 
of Norway and russia’s northern energy resources in the 
Northern dimension region (Patten, 1999). the dearth of 
speeches on the Northern dimension from the Energy Com-
missioner adds to the impression that the initiative does not 
play a vital role in the energy security policy of the Union.
In sum, we may conclude that yes, there is awareness 
of the High North as an energy region within the NdI. It 
has been included in policy documents both independently 
of and as a result of the Norwegian High North initiative. 
However, its inclusion has not led to concrete policy initi-
atives or resulted in more active interest. Note that schol-
ars (e.g., Catellani, 2001) have widely viewed the Northern 
dimension Initiative as quite vague and general in identify-
ing objectives and concrete actions. this general vagueness 
might of course have contributed to the lack of concrete 
policy on the High North as an energy region. 
An Energy Policy for Europe 
Energy issues were placed high on the agenda by the 
British EU Presidency at Hampton Court in October 2005. 
since then, energy security has gained political and public 
momentum. The term “the High North” first featured in EU 
energy policy papers in a 2006 Green Paper, which notes 
that “attention should be given to facilitating Norway’s 
efforts to develop resources in the high north of Europe in 
a sustainable manner” (EC, 2006a:16, par. 2.6). In its fol-
low-up to the Green Paper, the Parliament does not men-
tion the High North, but underlines the importance of good 
relations with the EU’s major energy supply partner coun-
tries, “particularly Norway, which remains the third largest 
oil producer in the world and which offers a stable energy 
supply and also has a proven track record of relations with 
russia in the energy sector” (European Parliament, 2006: 
par. 5). 
The 2006 Green Paper was confirmed in the Presidency 
conclusions of the European Council of 23–24 March 
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(Council of the European Union, 2006), which particularly 
emphasized the opening up of new gas supply routes from 
the Caspian region and North Africa. this document was 
followed up with a joint paper from the Commission and 
the High representative entitled An external policy to serve 
Europe’s energy interests (European Commission and the 
High representative of the European Council, 2006). With-
out stressing any particular energy region, the paper stated 
that the EU should “continue to pursue the strategic energy 
partnership with Norway” (European Commission and the 
High representative of the European Council, 2006:4). In 
a Communication later the same year, the Commission put 
great emphasis on EU-russian energy cooperation, but also 
mentioned the importance of other third countries, includ-
ing Norway (EC, 2006b:4 – 5)—without, however, being 
more precise about specific energy-producing sectors of the 
Norwegian Continental shelf. 
In January 2007, the Commission presented its “Energy 
Package” (EC, 2007a). this document too pays special 
attention to energy imports from the Caspian region (EC, 
2007a:24) and does not mention initiatives for the High 
North. the European Council endorsed the energy pack-
age on 8–9 March 2007 and also adopted an energy action 
plan for the next two years. russia, Central Asia, the Cas-
pian and the Black Sea regions are identified as “essential,” 
whereas Norway is mentioned only in connection with the 
Energy Community treaty, which aims to extend the inter-
nal energy market to southeastern Europe (Council of the 
European Union, 2007: par. III.4). then in a memo on exter-
nal energy policy dated 30 November 2007, the Commis-
sion notes that Norway is the EU’s second most important 
supplier of gas, which “gives the energy dialogue between 
the EU and Norway a special importance” (EC, 2007b: par. 
7), but again, the High North is not included in the picture.
former Commissioner for transport and Energy loy-
ola de Palacio has repeatedly underlined the importance 
of russia for EU energy security and has rarely mentioned 
Norway. for example, according to de Palacio, “more open 
relations with hydrocarbon-producing countries with special 
emphasis on russia and the countries in the Caspian area” 
were important for the development of an overall European 
energy strategy (de Palacio, 2000). to the degree that she 
has mentioned Norway, it has not been with respect to the 
Barents sea region. the term “High North” does not occur 
in any of her speeches, but she has stressed that Norway is 
among the countries with which the Commission aims to 
extend its cooperation (see, for example, de Palacio, 2002). 
Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs is more positive 
toward the High North resources and has argued that “it is 
impossible to underestimate the importance for Europe of 
energy exploration and production in the North” (Piebalgs, 
2005:2), and that “none doubt the enormous energy poten-
tial of this region” (Piebalgs, 2005:8). He has also used the 
term “High North,” stating that “the EU needs to take tangi-
ble steps to support Norway’s efforts to open the high north 
of Europe to energy development in an environmentally 
responsible way” and that “this will represent an important 
element of the EU’s future security of energy supplies and 
merits our strong backing” (Piebalgs, 2006a:7). this view 
must be interpreted as a firm interest and belief in the energy 
potential of the region, especially since it was expressed at 
a conference in Brussels with a general European audience. 
Most of the remaining 22 speeches and press releases stud-
ied here mention Norway, but without reference to the High 
North. 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso has talked 
about Norway and the High North in his energy-related 
speeches on two occasions, and both times Norwegian for-
eign Minister Jonas Gahr støre also made presentations. 
In 2006, Barroso noted that by not opening up particularly 
sensitive areas, Norway follows “the sort of coherent, multi-
dimensional approach to energy policy, maritime policy and 
environment policy, which the Commission is also adopt-
ing” (Barroso, 2006). thus, the Commission president has 
given full support to Norway’s policy regarding the pace of 
development in the region. during his visit to Norway in 
february 2008, Mr. Barroso said that Norway’s High North 
policy was “of great interest to the EU” (Barroso, 2008), 
without being more concrete. In his few other energy- 
related speeches, the Commission president has mentioned 
the importance of Norway as an energy supplier to Europe 
in general terms, but, like Piebalgs, he also emphasizes the 
special significance of EU-Russian energy relations to the 
Community’s energy security (see, for example, Barroso, 
2007). 
In sum, Norway features prominently in most of the 
policy documents that constitute the process toward a com-
mon energy policy for the EU. It is the Commission that 
mentions the Barents sea and the High North, terms not 
found in sections of Parliament or Council documents deal-
ing with energy policy. By and large, the documents and 
speeches show that Norway’s importance as an energy sup-
plier to the EU is significant, and it is expected that Nor-
way will increase its gas exports to Europe (EC, 2007c). 
However, the High North is generally not included in the 
picture. the term “High North” seems to have entered the 
EPE process in 2006, both in documents (the Green Paper) 
and in speeches (Barroso, 2006; Piebalgs, 2006a). (Interest-
ingly, in 2005 Piebalgs came to Kirkenes in North Norway 
to talk about the energy potential of the region—without 
ever using the term “High North.”) thus, there is awareness 
of Norway’s High North energy policy within both the EPE 
and the NdI processes. However, the EU’s initial interest in 
the High North does not seem to be followed up with more 
concrete initiatives or frequent mentions. What seem to be 
more important are concrete topics in EU-Norway energy 
relations, such as cooperation on carbon capture and stor-
age (see, for example, EC, 2007d, e) and Norway’s inclusion 
in the Energy Community treaty for south Eastern Europe 
(ECsEE). 
the Commission has included Norway and the High 
North in formal policy formulations to a greater extent than 
the Council and the Parliament have done, indicating that 
the topic of the High North has reached only a certain level 
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in formal EU policy processes, especially within the EPE. 
As argued earlier, policy is initiated at the Commission 
level, so there is great potential to influence its direction at 
that point. However, when documents reach a higher level 
in the policy process, the High North as an oil and gas prov-
ince seems to vanish. 
ENErGY IN tHE HIGH NOrtH
– INfOrMAl EU POlICY
2006 – Low Attention
Awareness of the Arctic in an energy perspective was 
generally low among EU policy-makers in 2006. for exam-
ple, one interviewee who was working with energy issues 
within the Council had never heard talk about the Arctic in 
an energy perspective within the EU. Indeed, EU engage-
ment in institutions like the Arctic Council was not very 
high at the time. An official within the Commission said 
that different parts of the Commission are encouraged to be 
involved in these institutions, but that Commission officials 
first focused on the central European agenda, and then, if 
any time was left, they could focus on other issues. It would 
appear that Europeans did not perceive the Arctic as a rele-
vant region in 2006. (see Offerdal, 2007 for more about the 
Arctic Council, including an assessment of its work related 
to oil and gas.)
Without exception, the interviewees mentioned russia’s 
Shtokman field in the Barents Sea as a major future poten-
tial energy source for Europe. they noted that the shtok-
man project was perhaps the only specific project in the 
Arctic that is discussed in the EU. thus, little awareness of 
or interest in the Norwegian part of the Barents sea existed 
among EU policy-makers in 2006. 
during an international energy relations conference 
organized by the European Commission called “Power 
through Energy: the EU and International relations of 
Energy,” which I attended in 2006, the Arctic was not men-
tioned with one word. the same was true in November of 
that year at another energy policy conference, where most 
relevant high-level EU officials gave presentations without 
ever referring to energy in the High North (European Com-
munities, 2007). Clearly, EU policy-makers did not pay 
much attention to the Barents sea as an oil and gas region. 
Even though Norwegian energy policy in the High North is 
mentioned in later Northern dimension documents, inter-
viewees closely involved in the NdI did not differ from 
other interviewees in their approach to the Barents sea as 
an oil and gas region. Moreover, except for two persons 
working directly with Arctic issues in the Commission and 
the Parliament, most EU officials had not heard the term 
“High North.” that said, Norwegian interviewees (govern-
mental officials and oil companies alike) and the European 
Commission’s delegation to Norway argued that although 
interest was low, it was increasing. 
2008 – Increased EU Interest? 
A new round of interviews in 2008 showed that the inter-
viewees who had pointed to a higher interest in 2006 had 
been right in some respects. Awareness of Norway’s High 
North energy policy had indeed increased among Commis-
sion officials between 2006 and 2008. In 2008 most inter-
viewees looked upon the region as important for future EU 
energy security. statoilHydro’s snøhvit project in the Bar-
ents sea was highlighted by many. Moreover, between 2006 
and 2008 EU officials had travelled to Norway more often 
to discuss High North issues and had visited Oslo, sval-
bard, and the Melkøya lNG plant processing gas from the 
Snøhvit field. 
EU officials generally tell their Norwegian colleagues 
that the EU is interested in high imports of Norwegian 
gas. However, no concrete initiatives have been taken with 
regard to either Norwegian production in general or the 
Barents sea in particular. In fact, according to interviews, 
Norwegian officials often hear indirectly about EU views 
on the pace of development through oil and gas companies 
that EU officials are in touch with. 
the great attention paid to russia, evident in 2006 
from the documents as well as the interview data, was 
also present in 2008, when interviewees described the EU- 
russian energy dialogue as important and somewhat inten-
sifying. However, according to EU officials close to the 
process, the EU-russian energy dialogue has not dealt with 
the Arctic. Nonetheless, interviewees noted that Norway’s 
analyses with regard to developments in russia were of 
interest to the EU. 
As for the Northern dimension, energy was not high on 
the informal agenda up until 2008 either. A possible part-
nership on transport was being discussed, but the Bar-
ents sea region in an energy security perspective was not 
included here. Finally, while some EU officials (particu-
larly those working directly with Norway and Arctic issues 
in the directorates General for transport and Energy and 
External relations) had heard the term “High North,” oth-
ers had not.
thus, comparing data from 2006 and 2008 at the infor-
mal level, we can note increased awareness of Norway’s 
High North policy, but seemingly not increased interest. 
the Commission did not make concrete initiatives or try to 
influence Norwegian High North energy policy in any way 
at the informal level. Interest took the form of EU policy-
makers wanting to get updates from Norway on the latest 
developments on the Norwegian continental shelf, but the 
High North was not part of an overall EU strategy, nor was 
it particularly in evidence in the EPE or NdI processes. 
HAS NORWAY INFLUENCED THE EU?
Norway has enjoyed relatively good access to the policy- 
making process within both the EPE and the NdI. this 
access has resulted in the mention of Norway’s High North 
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policy within both initiatives, limited almost exclusively to 
Commission documents. In this sense Norway has influ-
enced EU policy. some references to the energy potential in 
the European Arctic in an energy security context existed 
prior to the Norwegian High North initiative. However, inter-
views confirm that mention of the High North in EU policy 
documents has been the result of Norwegian policy-makers’ 
efforts to exert influence early in the process, at Commis-
sion level. Moreover, the Commission’s delegation to Nor-
way and Iceland, located in Oslo, plays an important role in 
informing the Commission about Norwegian policy. As the 
High North has topped the agenda in Oslo for years, this has 
been an important part of what Commission representatives 
in Norway have reported back to Brussels. thus, the inten-
sity of the debate on the High North in Norway has at least 
contributed to awareness of the topic in Brussels. One Com-
mission official noted that if Norway were not focusing on 
the High North, it would not be a topic in Brussels.
However, mentioning a topic does not necessarily mean 
taking an active interest or following up on it. the Council 
and the Parliament have not followed up on the High North 
in policy documents. this means that Norway has managed 
to influence the EU only to a certain extent. It also means 
that the EU has not used the window of opportunity that the 
Norwegian High North initiative might have represented in 
order to put weight behind its policy proposals within the 
EPE process. the High North has been included arbitrar-
ily and without much concreteness. the NdI has mentioned 
the High North and its energy potential more widely, but 
in a general, descriptive manner without concrete sugges-
tions to be followed up. the inclusion seems to be a direct 
result of the Norwegian High North initiative, which aims 
at putting the High North on the map of Europe, but the EU 
does not have much concrete ambition to do so. 
Finally, the rise in the number of visits from EU officials 
to Norway is not solely an indication of an interest in the 
Barents sea as an oil and gas region, but a result of the gen-
erally increased attention paid to Arctic issues within the 
Community. these visits do not indicate a coordinated and 
proactive strategy on the part of the EU, but a reaction to 
trends on the international level, where the circumpolar 
Arctic with its energy potential, climate change issues, and 
an increasingly assertive russia have been driving forces. 
Norway’s High North initiative fits well with this new 
agenda of the EU, but the more active agenda is not solely 
or even to any considerable extent a result of the Norwegian 
High North policy. 
POssIBlE INflUENCEs ON tHE EU APPrOACH
Why then did Norway not manage to get EU policy-
makers more interested in the High North during the early 
stages of the High North initiative, when energy security 
was high on the EU policy agenda and general interest in 
Arctic issues was growing? Interviews that focused on EU 
policy-makers’ definition of the situation, in combination 
with the expectations outlined earlier, enable us to iden-
tify factors likely to contribute to the sometimes seemingly 
high, at other times absent and thus rather arbitrary, interest 
in the High North among EU officials. These factors, found 
both at the Norwegian and at the EU level, are (1) lack of an 
overarching Arctic policy in the EU, (2) the character of the 
Norwegian High North initiative, and (3) EU views of Nor-
way as an energy producer and supplier. 
Lack of an Overarching Arctic Policy in the EU 
While the EU did start to pay more attention to Arc-
tic issues during the last months of this study, the Union 
had not yet decided on the contents of the Arctic policy or 
within what policy processes to place it. the EU will prob-
ably integrate its Arctic policy to a greater extent into the 
Northern dimension Initiative and its Maritime policy. 
Wherever future Arctic policy may materialize, however, it 
is likely to focus more on climate change and environmen-
tal issues than on energy security. 
the Northern dimension Initiative has not made any 
real attempts to put energy in the High North on the agenda 
in a more concrete manner than mentioning its potential 
for EU energy security. the NdI has thus used the energy 
potential in the Arctic merely to draw attention within 
the EU just as Norway has used it in its relations with the 
EU. that said, the more concrete reference to Norwegian 
High North policy in NdI documents from 2004 onwards 
would probably not have been there, had Oslo not wanted to 
include it. the sections on Norway are formulated in a way 
that informs about the topic but does not propose concrete 
follow-up measures.
thus, energy is used to attract attention, but only in order 
to talk about what one is really concerned about within the 
various initiatives. for the Northern dimension Initiative, 
this concern is securing the interests of northern European 
countries within the EU, and for Norway, it is enhancing 
Norway’s security, economic, and environmental interests. 
therefore, when the EPE process—which is exclusively 
linked to energy, and in which energy security is a crucial 
factor—does not follow up on Norway’s High North initi-
ative in a consistent and concrete manner, little of impor-
tance is left of what seemed to be at least a certain interest 
in the topic within the EU. 
What appears to be confusion within the EU as to where 
to place Arctic policy and energy policy initiatives might 
have given Norway the opportunity to reach a number of 
different actors with its message. However, as long as the 
EU does not use a single mechanism for dealing with Arc-
tic issues, and as long as the Northern dimension is not 
tasked to deal with energy security in any concrete manner, 
the references to Norway and the High North in EU policy 
may not be worth much in terms of chances for concrete 
follow-up. the directorate-General for External relations 
has only a single person handling Arctic issues, and this of 
course limits the amount of attention the Commission can 
pay to Arctic issues. to the degree that they focus on it, they 
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push other topics farther down on the agenda. the result is 
a poorly coordinated approach to Arctic matters within the 
EU, despite the EU’s own Northern dimension Initiative. 
diana Wallis, Vice President of the European Parliament 
and one of the few EU representatives to have shown an 
active interest in Arctic issues, has described it as follows:
It always seemed to me a shame that over the years 
we have had a steady stream of Norwegian ministers 
beating a path to Brussels to present the latest version 
of their High North strategy. Yet, whilst being politely 
received, these visits and presentations have not perhaps 
had the impact they deserved. these have been hugely 
important documents but the very lack of Arctic coordi-
nation in the EU Commission has meant that there is 
real uncertainty as to whom this policy document should 
be presented. Is it foreign policy? Is it environmental or 
energy? Or fishing? Of course it is all of these things 
and yet such documents, because of the nature of the EU 
as I have mentioned, do not fit well. (Wallis, 2008)
This finding corresponds with conclusions made in a sim-
ilar study of the U.s. response to Norwegian High North 
policy. to Washington, it was awkward to discuss such var-
ious issues as climate change, fisheries, and energy under 
the same umbrella. the result was confusion about how 
to interpret and respond to Oslo’s initiative (see Offerdal, 
2009). A similar lack of an overarching perspective on the 
Arctic thus reveals itself in Brussels. 
Character of the Norwegian High North Initiative
When describing Norway as an interest group that is try-
ing to influence policy processes in the EU, I assumed that 
since the Commission is in constant search of specialized 
expertise and is seeking to mobilize support for its policy 
initiatives, Norway would have a golden opportunity to 
influence the EPE and NDI processes on the basis of its 
High North initiative. 
As suggested earlier, a clearly defined strategy seems 
necessary to influence EU policy processes. However, a 
clear strategy presupposes a rational unitary actor with 
clear goals—and this does not appear to be the case for 
Norway. As the High North initiative developed, there was 
broad domestic consensus that Norway’s interests in the 
region should be promoted abroad. However, there was 
no consensus as to what exactly Norway’s interests in the 
High North were. the energy part of the Norwegian High 
North initiative does not represent an agreed policy in Nor-
way. Particularly relevant here is the fact that disagreement 
exists between Norway’s foreign Ministry (MfA) and the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) as to how—and 
in fact, whether—to present the High North as an energy 
region abroad. the MPE is fundamentally more sceptical 
than the MfA about the resource potential of the region. 
the High North is not a topic in the MPE’s energy talks 
with the Commission (interview with Norwegian official). 
Also, interviews and informal conversations indicate a pre-
vailing assumption in the MPE that drawing attention to the 
High North is not in Norway’s interest. While the MfA has 
focused on the attention aspect, the MPE has underlined 
several policy issues in the High North on which engage-
ment would be interpreted as interference rather than posi-
tive interest or attention. the pace of development is one 
such issue; the question of the continental shelf around 
svalbard and the delimitation issue with russia are other 
examples. 
the MPE thus appears to favor a less proactive approach 
to the High North in the country’s foreign policy than does 
the MfA. for these reasons the High North has simply not 
been addressed very actively by the most important actor in 
Norwegian energy diplomacy. for example, in a speech on 
the MPE’s policy toward Europe, former Minister of Petro-
leum and Energy, Åslaug Haga (2007a), did not mention 
the High North, but noted that renewable energy and car-
bon capture and storage topped the agenda in her ministry’s 
regular interactions with the EC. Interviews also show that 
production and export of Norwegian Continental shelf gas 
rank high on the energy agenda between Norway and the 
EU, but without any particular emphasis on the High North. 
Haga has also noted that, when she was to meet Commis-
sioner Piebalgs in 2007 as part of the energy dialogue, car-
bon capture and storage would “of course be on the top of 
the agenda” (Haga, 2007b, author’s translation from Nor-
wegian). If the MfA has not managed to convince the most 
important actor in Norway’s energy relations with the EU 
of the importance of the High North, the prospects for 
influencing relevant policy-makers in the EU are severely 
limited. 
Norway’s High North energy policy toward the EU has 
been based in part on an argument of interest: the claim that 
Norway possesses something that the EU wants in the High 
North (large oil and gas resources). As noted earlier, stake-
holders need to provide good and objective information 
to exert influence. Norway has proclaimed its own policy 
in order to get attention, but in terms of input has offered 
only vague formulations about a potentially huge resource 
base. the objectivity of Norway’s information campaign 
can therefore be questioned. It is not clear to the Europe-
ans what exactly the Norwegians want them to do with 
the High North. Oslo obviously does not want interference 
from the EU, but would like the Community to be aware of 
Norwegian policy in the region and perhaps get support if a 
difficult situation should emerge, particularly with Russia. 
However, the strategy of pursuing a pure information cam-
paign has not been enough to create active interest on the 
part of the EU. for one thing, the information that Norway 
provides has not been clearly linked to benefits for the EU. 
Norway has thus failed to offer anything in return for atten-
tion from Brussels. that said, even if Oslo could have pre-
sented Brussels with significant oil and gas estimates in the 
region, the response from Brussels might nevertheless have 
been muted. the reason lies in the way EU policy-makers 
view Norway as an energy producer and supplier. 
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EU Views on Norway as an Energy Producer and Supplier 
the interviews show that EU policy-makers are satis-
fied with Norway’s estimated increase in gas deliveries 
(125–140 billion cubic meters early in the coming decade) 
and trust that Norway will follow through. they give less 
consideration to where on the Norwegian continental shelf 
(NCS) the gas comes from. One Commission official, refer-
ring to overall production on the NCs, said that “so far the 
Norwegians are doing fine. They are producing at the pace 
that they should produce.” Only when there are indications 
that Norway can no longer keep up with its expected gas 
exports will the issue of developing the High North perhaps 
become more interesting to the EU. right now, it does not 
really matter whether supplies come from the North sea, 
the Norwegian sea, or the Barents sea. What interests the 
EU is that Norway can manage to keep up and increase its 
production and export according to current estimates. this 
seems possible in the foreseeable future without much pro-
duction in the Barents Sea. One European Union official 
noted that despite their age, the North Sea fields like the 
Troll field are still strong.
Another important factor in EU policy-makers’ defini-
tion of Norway as an energy producer is that the climate 
for investment on the NCs is perceived as good. Many 
interviewees argued that since there are no problems with 
Norway, the EU does not need to direct attention there. 
Commission President Barroso strengthened this impres-
sion when noting that if all external suppliers were as sure 
and reliable as Norway, energy security would be much less 
of an issue within the EU today (Barroso, 2006, 2008). We 
recall that the degree of interdependence between actors 
can have important consequences for policy outcomes. In 
addition, perceptions of the effort necessary to obtain the 
other actor’s resources are vital for determining the degree 
of political attention that will be given. EU policy-makers 
have the impression that there is no need to invest a lot of 
resources in Norway because Norway will make sure that 
developments go in the desired direction, independent of 
the amount of EU engagement. 
And thus we see the paradoxical negative effect of Nor-
way’s exemplary behaviour on the energy arena. foreign 
ministries are looking for problems to be solved—not 
solutions that already exist. In fact, the Norwegian for-
eign minister himself has indicated this: “As foreign Min-
ister,… I—like other foreign Ministers—have to adapt 
our resources and put our diplomats to work where there 
are problems to be solved and diplomatic challenges to be 
addressed” (støre, 2008). this is exactly what the EU is 
doing in its approach to Norway’s energy policy in the High 
North. Norway is seen as part of the solution to the EU’s 
energy supply challenge, but what is crucial to understand 
is that it is viewed as a solution that is already there, not 
something in need of intensive efforts. Although Norway is 
not an EU member, it seems that the absence of problems 
with production on and deliveries from the NCs sometimes 
leads EU officials to count Norway’s oil and gas resources 
as “part of the family”: “today, the EU plus Norway is 
the world’s fourth largest hydrocarbon producer only out-
stripped by russia, the United states and saudi Arabia” 
(Piebalgs, 2006b). Accordingly, Norway’s gas supplies to 
the EU are almost taken for granted—so why invest heavily 
in securing what is already there?
CONClUsION
EU interest in the Arctic up until early 2008 was ad hoc, 
coincidental, and to a certain extent based on the interest 
shown by individuals within the EU system. from 2006, the 
Commission started to think that the EU should develop a 
more consolidated policy around Arctic issues. However, it 
was not decided whether this was to be part of the Northern 
dimension or the maritime strategy, or part of a broader for-
eign policy. Increased EU interest in the Arctic toward the 
end of the period studied here does not seem so much a result 
of Norway’s High North initiative, as of the heightened inter-
national focus on the topic, with climate change and russian 
Arctic policy as primary driving forces. since 2006, how-
ever, Oslo has created increased awareness in Brussels of 
Norwegian High North energy policy. Norway has managed 
to enter the EU policy process at an early, drafting stage, 
which has resulted in mention in some energy policy docu-
ments. that said, most of the interest that the EU did show in 
its informal and formal policy was primarily linked to Nor-
way as an energy supplier in general: interest in the High 
North has remained arbitrary and lacks concrete content.
A combination of institutional confusion in the EU, lack 
of coherence and clarity in the Norwegian approach, and 
Norway’s good energy reputation has placed important con-
straints on Norway’s ability to take advantage of its High 
North resources in relations with the EU. the presence of 
the High North in EU policy is most likely a result of the 
openness of the EU system and of the general importance 
of Norway as a gas supplier to Europe, but Norway’s High 
North is not perceived as an energy region for the EU to 
rely on in the foreseeable future. If Norway had promoted 
the North sea as a still-important energy province, this idea 
would probably also have reached the policy documents. 
thus, Norway can affect EU policy to a certain extent 
because of its position as an energy supplier to Europe. 
However, High North energy has not shown itself as a great 
foreign policy asset, leaving Norway unsuccessful in using 
its High North diplomacy to take advantage of the increased 
focus on energy security within the EU. 
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